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COMMENTARY
BLINDFOLDING THE COURTS: A FURTHER COMMENT ON
PHOTO PRODUCTION v. SECURICOR
The decision of the House of Lords in Photo Production Ltd. v.
Securicor Transport Ltd.1 has received the qualified approval of
Professor Ogilvie in this journal2 and that of commentators in
other journals.3 This is not altogether surprising. After all, Photo
Production overrules the notorious decision in Harbutt's "Plasti-
cine" Ltd. v. Wayne Tank and Pump Co. Ltd. ,4 a decision which
probably has the distinction of being the only important contract
decision in recent legal history not to find a single academic
backer. 5
Yet Professor Ogilvie6 and the other commentators' are
troubled by the uncertainties left by the decision in Photo
Production. Their concern is justified.
That uncertainty will only be dispelled once the problem in
Photo Production is seen as having nothing to do with exclusion
(or exemption) clauses. An intelligent resolution of the problem
raised in a case such as Photo Production can only be achieved by
1 [198011 All E.R. 556, [1980] 2 W.L.R. 283.
2 "Suisse Altantique Re-vindicated: How Long, 0 Lords, How Long?", 5 C.B.L.J. 100
(1980).
3 See, e.g., A. Nicol and R. Rawlings, Notes, 43 Mod. L. Rev. 567 (1980); N. E. Palmer
and A. Evans, 58 Can. Bar Rev. 773 (1980); J. S. Ziegel, 30 U. of Tor. L.J. 421 (1980).
4 [197011 Q.B. 447 (C.A.).
5 For comments critical of the decision see, e.g., P. N. Legh-Jones and M. A. Pickering,
"Harbutt's 'Plasticine' Ltd. v. Wayne Tank and Pump Co. Ltd.: Fundamental Breach
and Exemption Clauses, Damages and Interest", 86 L.Q.R. 513 (1970); B. Coote, "The
Effect of Discharge by Breach on Exception Clauses", [1970] 28 Camb. L.J. 221, and the
notes by J. A. Weir, [1970] 28 Camb. L.J. 189 and J. H. Baker, 33 Mod. L. Rev. 441
(1970). The most penetrating criticism of the decision is suggested by Professor P. S.
Atiyah who asked "would the decision have been much more sensible in policy even if
there had been no exclusion clause at all?"; see his review of Professor S. M. Waddams'
book on Products Liability in 26 U. Tor. L.J. 118 (1976), at p. 120.
6 Supra, footnote 2. Professor Ogilvie thinks that much of the future uncertainty in this
area of the law is to be attributed to the "frequency with which Lord Denning deals with
these cases". In my view, the confusion and waste that will be generated in the post-
Photo Production era cannot be blamed on the Master of the Rolls.
7 Supra, footnote 3.
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abolishing the law of subrogation in so far as it relates to fire and
liability insurance.
1. The Uncertainties after Photo Production
One does not need a vivid imagination to foresee the nice
questions left for interpretation and construction by the decision.
It will be remembered that Musgrove, the patrolman employed
by Securicor, caused the loss by starting a small fire which got out
of control. The exclusion clause in Photo Production provided: 7a
"Under no circumstances shall the company be responsible for any
injurious act or default by any employee of the company unless such act or
default could have been foreseen and avoided by the exercise of due
diligence on the part of the company and his employer ... "
Suppose that after Photo Production, an employee is sent by a
firm like Securicor and causes a fire. The employee was hired
despite the fact that he was dismissed for recklessness from his
previous employment ten years ago. Suppose again that the
employee who sets a fire is one who is sent by his company with
full knowledge that the employee is under great emotional strain
because his wife and children had been killed a week earlier. The
courts will in these cases have the unenviable task of construing
the exclusion clause and determining whether the defendant
acted with "due diligence". The only certain answer to these
questions is that their resolution is uncertain.8
The uncertainties increase, as Messrs. Nicol and Rawlings
observe, 9 when one turns from Photo Production to "consumer"
cases such as Levison and Another v. Patent Steam Carpet
Cleaning Co. Ltd.10 The Levisons owned a carpet worth £900
which they insured. They entrusted the carpet to the defendants
for cleaning. The defendants failed to return the carpet and relied
on an exclusion clause which sought to limit their liability to £40.
In a subrogated action by the insurer, the English Court of
7a Supra, footnote 1 at p. 559 All E.R., p. 286 W.L.R.
8 There is a considerable body of case law on the question of whether the insured acted
with "due diligence"; see, e.g., Woolfall and Rimmer, Ltd. v. Moyle, [1942] 1 K.B. 66
(C.A.); Fraser v. B. N. Furman (Productions) Ltd., Miller Smith & Partners, Third
Party, [1967] 1 W.L.R. 898 (C.A.); Hartley Ltd. v. Provincial Insurance Co., Ltd.,
[1957] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 121. How much assistance the courts will derive from this body of
case law is, indeed, problematic.
9 See 43 Mod. L. Rev. 567 (1980), at p. 569.
10 [1978] Q.B. 69 (C.A.); see the comment by R. T. H. Stone, 41 Mod. L. Rev. 748
(1978).
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Appeal held that the defendant could not rely on the exemption
clause because it had committed a fundamental breach. It is
probable that the same result would be reached after the decision
in Photo Production. The House of Lords in that case left
consumers to be protected by the Unfair Contract Terms Act,
1977.11 Under s. 3(2)(b)(i) of that Act the defendants would
probably be found to have rendered "a contractual performance
substantially different from that which was reasonably expected
of him". 12 This sounds reasonable enough; after all one should
generally have different rules to deal with consumer contracts as
opposed to commercial contracts.13 The difficulty with this is that
Levison is not a "consumer" case; like Photo Production it is very
probably a contest between two insurance companies. 14
2. Why the Charade?
If Photo Production, Levison and scores of other cases are
contests between two insurance companies, why is this disguised
from the world? It is necessary to identify the interests of various
groups in helping maintain the charade. The insurance companies
have an interest in concealing their identities because the
revelation of their identities would disclose that there were at
least two policies to cover one risk. This becomes particularly
embarrassing when insurance brokers15 and the Financial Times
16
11 The Act (1977 (U.K.), c. 50) has produced a great deal of commentary; see, e.g., R.
Lawson, Exclusion Clauses After the Unfair Contract Terms Act (London Oyez Pub.,
1978); P. K. Thompson, Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (London, Butterworths, 1978);
B. Coote, "Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977", 41 Mod. L. Rev. 312 (1978); J. N.
Adams, "An Optimistic Look at the Contract Provisions of Unfair Contract Terms Act
1977", 41 Mod. L. Rev. 703 (1978); L. S. Sealy, Comment, (1978] 37 Camb. L.J. 15; M.
H. Ogilvie, Commentary, 4 C.B.L.J. 97 (1979). The impact of the statute in terms of
consumer protection seems to be perilously close to zero.
12 This section is subject to a "reasonableness" test. Whether a disclaimer clause can be
upheld as being "reasonable" if insurance exists (or is available) is unknown and can
only be known after litigation.
13 Thus, to take only one example, it seems reasonable to make damages the primary
remedy in commercial sales whereas it would be calamitous to do so in consumer sales.
14 We know for a fact that in Photo Production, Photo Production were insured except for
a deductible of £25,000 while Securicor carried liability insurance except for a
deductible of £10,000; see the judgment of Lord Denning M.R. at [1978] 1 W.L.R. 856
at p. 866. In Levison, we know for a fact that the plaintiff was insured. It is possible that
the defendant was uninsured but this seems highly unlikely.
15 See, e.g., A. V. Alexander, "The Law of Tort and Non-Physical Loss: Insurance
Aspects" 12 J.S.P.T.L. (N.S.) 119 (1972), at p. 122 where the author, Managing
Director, Sedgwick Collins & Co. Ltd. writes: "Not infrequently one sees the rather
[Vol. 5
Commentary 501
reveal that it is not uncommon for one insurance company to
underwrite the potential loss of both sides of a bargain. The legal
profession has an interest in keeping the subrogation game going
because it is a highly lucrative business. After all, the Harbutt's
"Plasticine" saga generated two cases which went to the English
Court of Appeal 17 when, under a rational system of loss distribu-
tion, no litigation at all should have been permitted. Finally,
academic commentators have an interest in maintaining the
doctrine of subrogation. After all, many of our leading cases
would disappear if property damage claims were to be abolished
and we have an investment in the knowledge we have acquired so
painfully. 18
3. The Arguments for Subrogation
It is necessary to examine the arguments (implicit and explicit)
that have been advanced in favour of subrogation.
(a) Subrogation as a cost saver
According to one insurance authority, subrogation reduces
insurance premiums because insurance companies fix their rates
after having taken into account "net subrogation recoveries".19
There are two difficulties with this argument. In the first place,
subrogation recoveries constitute only a minute fraction of the
payouts made by insurance companies. Thus, in 1972, fire
insurers in the United States paid out $973,636,000 in fire claims
and recovered only $6,621,000 (.68% of the losses paid) through
subrogation.
20
absurd spectacle of a fire insurer seeking to exercise rights of subrogation against a third
party who is insured by the liability department of the same insurance company".
16 See the issue of February 25, 1980, quoted in Nicol and Rawlings, 43 Mod. L. Rev. 567
(1980), at p. 571 note 34.
17 See the original case in [1970] 1 Q.B. 447 (C.A.). For subsequent proceedings by the
defendant against one of its insurers, see Wayne Tank and Pump Co. Ltd. v. Employers
Liability Assurance Corp. Ltd., [1974] Q.B. 57 (C.A.).
18 Thus, in New Zealand, law teachers have still not been able to sever the Accident
Compensation Act from the law of torts. In the words of Professor T. G. Ison, "It [the
Accident Compensation Act] is still covered in the torts course, almost as if it has no
legitimacy except an etiological root in private law"; see his book, Accident
Compensation (London, Croom Helm, 1980) p. 184.
9 See R. C. Horn, Subrogation in Insurance Theory and Practice (Homewood, Illinois, R.
D. Irwin, 1964), p. 25.
20 See the figures cited in J. J. Meyers, "Subrogation Rights and Recoveries Arising Out of
First Party Contracts", 9 Forum 83 (1973) at pp. 84-5. I do not believe that these figures
1980-81]
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Secondly, and more important, one can only speak meaning-
fully of "net subrogation recoveries" if the insurer provides only
first party (e.g., fire insurance) rather than first and third party
liability insurance. In the course of a long search, I have yet to
find a company which provided fire insurance but which did not
provide liability insurance. Once an insurer underwrites liability
insurance as well as fire insurance, then in addition to computing
"net subrogation recoveries", it will also be necessary to compute
"net subrogation liabilities". Since one would expect subrogation
recoveries and subrogation liabilities to cancel each other out on
a "swings and roundabouts" basis, it seems difficult to see how
subrogation could help lower rates. On the other hand, it seems
to be certain that subrogation actions have the effect of making
insurance more expensive since it is a costly business to shift costs
from one insurer to another.
21
(b) Subrogation as a deterrent against negligent behaviour
It will be argued by some that subrogation is needed to deter
negligent behaviour. However, there are formidable difficulties
with this.
If we truly believe that subrogation claims deter negligent
behaviour by corporations, we should ban liability insurance by
potential defendants in cases such as Photo Production and
Levison. The argument that subrogation claims promote safety
not in the individual case but by increasing premiums for delin-
quent companies with bad accident records22 is most unlikely to
be true because insurance companies very infrequently bring
subrogated claims.
23
Second, insurance companies very seldom bring subrogated
claims because of the cost of determining negligence and other
costs such as challenging the validity of exculpatory clauses. The
fact that subrogated claims are brought infrequently is not lost on
corporate defendants who are unlikely to regard subrogated
are freakish. Insurance companies will use subrogated actions infrequently because they
are expensive. At the same time, insurers must sometimes use subrogated actions if they
are to maintain the benefits that accrue to them because of overlapping coverage.
21 See, e.g., T. G. Ison, The Forensic Lottery (London, Staples Press, 1967), p. 98; see also
S. L. Kimball and D. A. Davis, "The Extension of Insurance Subrogation", 60 Mich. L.
Rev. 841 (1962).
22 See, e.g., J. G. Fleming, "The Role of Negligence in Modern Tort Law", 53 Va. L.
Rev. 815 (1967), at p. 825.
23 See text at footnote 20, supra. It is also significant that in automobile liability claims,




claims (against which they are insured) as much of a deterrent.
Finally, the real deterrent against negligent conduct on the part
of corporations is that corporations may be unable to operate
their businesses after a serious loss. Thus, in Photo Production,
Securicor would suffer a loss of business as a result of the
conflagration. If a corporation does not fear the loss of business
as a result of an accident, it is unlikely to fear the possibility of a
subrogated claim against which it is insured. 24 Further, if a corpo-
ration has been truly delinquent, the criminal law is likely to be a
more satisfactory weapon against corporations because the
criminal law is interested in culpability rather than quantum of
loss.
4. The Shape of a Reforming Statute
Some things are obvious when one gets down to draft a
reforming statute in this area. First, one makes sure that assign-
ments of claims are abolished together with subrogation claims in
fire and liability insurance. Second, it is important to make sure
that after the action for subrogation has been abolished the
insured cannot bring an action to recover the deductible. The
deductible may be large, in which case the problem of
overlapping coverage remains. 25 It is better to attack the problem
of deductibles by negotiations between large enterprises and their
insurers, and by legislation for consumers and small businesses.
Third, it is probably more desirable to allow those people who
have underinsured to bear their own losses. 26 It is, after all,
difficult to distinguish this situation from that of the deductible.
Fourth, I would suggest that people who carry insurance should
be forced to claim from their own insurers rather than suing
tortfeasors. To some this may seem strong medicine but it is
important if the evil of overlapping coverage is to be removed.
24 See, in this connection, the comments of the New York State Insurance Department on
the utility of tort claims as a means of achieving safety on the roads: "Individual, last-
moment driver mistakes - undeterred by fear of death, injury, imprisonment, fine or
loss of licence - surely cannot be deterred by fear of civil liability against which one is
insured"; see their Report, Automobile Insurance ... for Whose Benefit? (New York,
1970), p. 12.
25 Even when the deductible is small, the waste caused by these actions is indefensible.
See, e.g., the remarkable claim in Hobbs v. Marlowe, [1977] 2 All E.R. 241 (H.L.),
noted by J. Birds, "Motor Insurance and the Knock for Knock Agreements", 41 Mod.
L. Rev. 201 (1978).
26 The law relating to the measurement of property losses caused by fire is in a profoundly
unsatisfactory state; see J. A. Gilbert, " 'Actual Cash Value' Revisited", 4 C.B.L.J. 120
(1979).
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Since the overwhelming number of insureds (consumers as well as
business enterprises) would prefer to claim from their own
insurers, it does not seem an unreasonable imposition to require a
minute faction of policyholders to do the same.
We are left with the problem of those who cannot obtain
insurance whether because of poverty or because of
"redlining". 2 7 One possibility is to let these people continue to
sue in tort. I do not think this is a desirable solution for two
reasons: first, the people who are unable to obtain insurance are
likely to be poor and will have difficulty finding a lawyer; second,
a freak accident may occur in which, say, a hundred residential
tenants lose their uninsured property as the result of a fire which
has been negligently caused by a corporate defendant. The result
of such a liability being imposed might well cause other corporate
defendants to take out liability insurance and we would once
again have expensive litigation. The choice then boils down to
whether one assigns uninsurable risks to private insurers or to the
goverment. In my view, there are great difficulties in devising and
operating an assigned risk scheme. 28 Further, a government-run
scheme can be run more cheaply than a private insurance scheme.
Conclusion
Fourteen years ago, my colleague Professor Ison pointed out
that our "system" of compensating property losses was as unsatis-
factory as our "system" for compensating personal injuries.2 9 In
the ensuing years, academic debate has, understandably, concen-
trated on the more important problem of compensation for
personal injuries.
We have lost sight of the fact that our "system" of compen-
sating for property losses is an expensive farce. It seems high time
to put an end to a system which can only operate by blinding us to
what is really going on.
Reuben Hasson*
27 No one knows how serious a problem "redlining" is in either England or Canada. The
problem is a serious one in the United States: see D. I. Badain, "Insurance Redlining
and the Future of the Urban Core", 16 Columbia J. of Law & Social Problems 1 (1980).
28 The difficulties involved in operating assigned risk plans in the field of motor vehicle
insurance are fully canvassed in U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Automobile Insurance
and Compensation Study, A Study of Assigned Risk Plans (Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Office, 1970).
29 See The Forensic Lottery, supra, footnote 21 at pp. 97-100.
* Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University
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